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In this paper I analyze the crowding-out eﬀects of public transfers on labor supply of
the elderly in the context of developing countries. I argue that the interactions between
private transfers recieved and labor supplied by the elderly aﬀect the oppportunity cost of
retirement and therefore magnify the crowding-out eﬀects of public transfers on the labor
supply of the elderly. Using household survey data from Vietnam, I ﬁnd the evidence
supporting this hypothesis. That is, the crowding-out eﬀect is about two times larger when
accounting for the endogeneity of private transfers, which is caused by the interactions of
private transfers and the labor supply.
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11 Introduction
People in developing countries are exposed to a severe shortage of institutionalized risk-sharing
mechanisms against longevity risks like public social security programs or private annuity mar-
kets. Consequently, old people rely mainly on family support systems. The ﬂow of private
transfers from young to old agents such as remittances from children who live in urban areas
or abroad to parents who live in rural areas are widely observed (e.g. see Cox and Jimenez
(2006), Cox (2004) and World-Bank (1994)). However, the family support system to the old
fails to provide full insurance. It alone fails to pool risk eﬃciently over diﬀerent families and it
is vulnerable to economic and social changes like migration and aging. As a consequence, many
of the elderly who do not have family support or other assets have to work as long as they
are physically capable. There is evidence that there are a signiﬁcant number of people work-
ing at very high ages in developing countries such as Indonesia (McKee (2006)) and Vietnam
(see ﬁgure 1). The failure of the private sector in providing full social insurance in developing
countries raises the role of government in protecting people at older ages. Recently, several
developing countries have reformed their social security systems and extended the coverage of
public transfer programs to uncovered elderly workers and more countries consider instituting
similar programs.
There is a huge literature analyzing the crowding-out eﬀects of public transfer programs (e.g.
see Diamond (1965), Barro (1974), Becker (1974), Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), Imrohoroglu,
Imrohoroglu and Joines (1999), Fuster (1999), Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007), and
more recently Jung and Tran (2007)). Particularly, there is an empirical literature examining
the crowding-out eﬀects of public transfers in the context of developing countries. Public
transfers crowding out private transfers have been reported for Peru, the Philippines and South
Africa (see Cox and Jimenez (1992), Cox and Jimenez (1995) and Jensen (2003)). There is
also evidence that the introduction of social pension programs crowds out labor supply of
the elderly in Brazil (Filho (2004)). In addition, there is a strand of literature analyzing the
relationship between private transfers and labor supply of the elderly. Cameron and Cobb-
Clark (2001, 2002, 2005) study to what extent family support in the form of cash transfers and
living arrangements inﬂuence the labor market behavior of old-age Indonesian men and ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant evidence. Even though the pairwise relationships, that between public and private
transfers, that between public transfers and labor supply, and that between private transfers and
labor supply have been studied by the empirical literature focusing on developing countries, the
2dynamics of public transfers, private transfers and labor supply are usually abstracted. McKee
(2006) is known as the ﬁrst attempt to study public transfers, family support and labor supply
of the elderly together in a dynamic programming framework. He ﬁnds that family support
and public pension beneﬁts have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the labor market behavior of older men
in Indonesia, which contradicts the ﬁndings of Cameron and Cobb-Clark.
So far the previous studies understate the importance of interactions between private trans-
fers received and labor supplied by the elderly when evaluating the crowding-out eﬀects of public
transfer programs. In my opinion, accounting for these interactions is essential because these
interactions result in a change in opportunity cost of retirement and then labor market behavior
of the elderly. The following is a main mechanism. As young individuals observe that their old
parents are healthy and still able to work they might think that their parents need less support;
therefore they would transfer less to their parents. On the other hand, as the elderly are aware
of the fact that their labor decision would aﬀect the amount of transfers received from their
children, the elderly would have to take into account the potential eﬀects of their labor/leisure
choice on the amount of private transfers. That is, if the elderly decide to work longer they
would increase their labor earnings but lose not only the utility derived from consuming leisure
time but also a chance to receive more private transfers from children. The elderly therefore
should optimize their labor supply while taking into account both forgone labor earning and the
forgone amount of private transfers from their children. In such environment, where children
actually pays for a part of the cost of the parent’s leisure, the opportunity cost of not working
is lower for the elderly. Consequently, the income eﬀect on labor supplied by the elderly is
magniﬁed.
In the context of developing countries, where the ﬂows of private transfers are important,
these dynamics has important implications for evaluating the eﬀects of public transfer programs
on labor market behavior of the elderly. However, little is known about the role of these
interactions. Part of the problem is due to the lack of awareness of the importance of accounting
for these interactions in the empirical literature in developing countries. Furthermore, there is
a lack of adequate data because there are very few data sets available containing information
about public transfers, private transfers, and labor supply.
This paper makes two key contributions. First, I use a simple overlapping generation model
to formulate the interactions between transfers received and labor supplied by the elderly and
to show that these interactions results in a decline in opportunity cost of retirement, which
then magnify the crowding-out eﬀects of public transfers on labor supply of the elderly. Second,
3using the data from a Vietnam household survey I ﬁnd the evidence supporting this hypothesis.
That is, not controlling for endogeneity of private transfers received by the elderly, which is
caused by these interactions, results in a downward bias in estimating these crowding-out eﬀects.
Particularly, when the endogeneity of private transfers is taken into account, the estimate of
the marginal eﬀect of public pensions on retirement is about two times larger and that of inter-
household transfers on retirement is about at least ten times larger. In addition, I ﬁnds the
evidence supporting the crowding-out hypothesis. Particularly, an increase in public pension
income or inter-household transfer income by 100 dollar increases the probability to retire by
either 7% or 13%, respectively.
The paper is organized in the following way. The theoretical framework is presented in
section 2. The econometric speciﬁcation and estimation strategy are described in section 3. An
overview of Vietnam’s economy and the institutionalized social security system of Vietnam is
presented in section 4. Details on the Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1998 and a descriptive
analysis of the data are in section 5. Empirical results and discussions are presented in section
6. I conclude in section 7.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I develop a simple model to investigate the role of interactions between private
transfers from young children and labor decisions of the old parent in evaluating the crowding-
out eﬀects of public transfers. I consider a partial equilibrium environment with an agent, who
lives for two periods: young and old, who derives utility from consumption when young and
from consumption and leisure when old. The agent supplies labor inelastically when young and
elastically when old. The agent has a child at the end of the young period and becomes a parent
when old. The child is assumed to be altruistic towards the parent so that the child is willing
to transfer a part of his income to support the parent. The agent receives public transfers
from government (a pension) and private transfers from a child when old. The agent chooses
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the time constraint
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i ≤ 1, (3)
and a transfer rule of the child





i are consumptions when young and old, respectively; lo
i is leisure when old; β
is the discount factor; κ is a weight on the parent’s utility from leisure; w is the market wage
rate; 1 + rt is the market interest rate; Pi are government transfers; Ti are private transfers
received from his child. It is assumed that the private transfers is a non- increasing function





i ≤ 0. This assumption implies that the child’s decision on private transfers
is responsive to the parent’s choice. The child tends to transfer less if the parent increases its
consumption when old.
A solution to the household problem depends on how the parent reacts to transfers from
the child. There are two possible cases. First, there are interactions between private transfers
received from the child and labor supply by the parent. It is the case that the parent is fully
aware that the child is altruistic and transfers money to support the parent when old. The rule
that his child follows to react to consumption when old is known by the parent. In this case, the
parent treats private transfers as an endogenous variable and takes into account the transfer
rule when solving the household utility maximization problem. Second, there is no interaction.
In this case, the child’s decision on private transfers is not responsive to the parent’s decision. A
change in the level of the parent’s consumption has no eﬀect on the amount of transfers received
by the parent. It implies that the parent cannot manipulate the decision of the child to get
more transfers from the child. In this case the parent treats private transfers as an exogenous
variable and takes private transfers as given when solving for the optimal consumptions and
leisure.
Private transfers as an endogenous variable
When private transfers are treated as an endogenous variable, the optimal decision rules on

































































￿ (Pi + Ti). (7)
Private transfers as an exogenous variable
When private transfers are independent of the parent’s choice, the parent just ignores the




























(Pi + Ti). (10)
Proposition 1 The crowding-out eﬀect of public transfers is larger when inter-household trans-
fers are endogenous.
















￿ is the marginal eﬀect of public transfers when




i captures the feedback eﬀect. When private
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∂x > 0, then g(x) is an increasing
function in x ≥ 0. Hence, for every x > 0, it is always true that g(x) > g(0). As a result, the






















This result implies that when the parent does take into account the transfer rule of his child,
the marginal eﬀect of public transfers on labor supply when old is magniﬁed. The intuition
6for this result is clear. The opportunity cost of enjoying leisure time when old is the forgone
labor earning. As the child is altruistic and his transfer decision is responsive to the parent’s
choice, the child will increase transfers to the parent in order to compensate the parent for
income losses from reducing labor supply to consume more leisure. In this environment, the
child actually pays for a part of the cost of the parent’s leisure. The parent’s opportunity cost
of not working when old is lower when private transfers are endogenous rather than exogenous.
The income eﬀect on the demand for leisure is therefore larger when private transfers are
endogenous. Consequently, the parent tends to consume more leisure when more income from
public transfer programs available. Thus, the marginal eﬀect of public transfers on labor/leisure
choice is magniﬁed when there are interactions between private transfers received and labor
supplied by the elderly.
This result has an implication for empirical studies on the crowding-out eﬀects of public
transfers. In developed countries, where the ﬂows of private transfers from children to par-
ents are relatively small and private transfers do not play a signiﬁcant role in determining
labor/leisure choice or retirement of the elderly, it might be ﬁne to ignore these dynamics when
studying labor market behavior of the elderly. However, in developing countries, where there
are relatively large ﬂows of transfers across households and generations, it is essential to take
into account the interactions between transfers received and labor hours supplied by the elderly
when evaluating the eﬀects of public transfer programs.
Proposition 2 Public and private transfers crowd out labor supply when old.
















￿ > 0, the demand for leisure of the elderly is an
increasing function of public transfers and inter-household transfers.
This result is consistent with the previous literature on the crowding-out eﬀects of public
transfers.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
As documented in the literature, motives for private transfers may not be purely altruistic (e.g.
see Hurd (1987), Cox (1987) and Altonji and Kotlikoﬀ (1997)). The motives for private transfers
could be diﬀerent such as a means to secure an inheritance from parents, part of an exchange
of services, joy of giving, social norms, or a risk-sharing agreement. In addition, interactions
between parents and children and even among children are dynamic rather than static as
7assumed in the theoretical model. As a consequence, interactions between parent’s labor/leisure
choice and private transfers are far more complex. However, as long as old agents could
strategically act to attract more transfers from their children, private transfers are endogenously
determined. As a result, it is necessary to control for endogeneity of private transfers when
estimating the eﬀects of public transfers on the labor supply decision of the elderly. Otherwise,
these eﬀects would be under-estimated. This section aims to explore that problem with data
from a household survey in Vietnam. Particularly, it will focus on two questions: First, is there
any evidence on the interaction between the labor choice of the elderly and inter-household
transfers, which leads to endogeneity of inter-household transfers received by the aged parents?
Second, to what extent are the crowding-out eﬀects underestimated when the endogeneity issue
is ignored?
An Empirical Model of Retirement Choice
It is assumed that every old agent i has a latent demand for leisure l∗
i,which governs the
retirement choice. The latent demand is assumed to be a function of public transfers, inter-
household private transfers, and incomes. There is no restriction on the domain of latent
demand for leisure and l∗
i could have any value. On the supply side, however, the supply of
leisure time is naturally limited. For example, there is a maximum of 24 hours available per
a day and 7 days available per week. Agents are naturally restricted to consume at most the
natural limit l∗
i ≤ l and 1 − l∗
i is labor supply. When the latent demand for leisure is equal
to or greater than the upper time limit l∗
i ≥ l, it means that agents choose not to work. The









The latent demand for leisure is determined according to
l∗






where Pi is the amount of government transfers; Ti is the amount of inter-household transfers;
Xdc
i is a vector of variables representing characteristics of other household members such as
human capital and health status which control for within-household transfers; X
p
i is a vector
of characteristics of the parent controlling for human capital and income; components of Xh
i
8are overall characteristics of the household such as types of house and value of durable goods;
ﬁnally, ε1




i are used to control for the agent’s income
and the ﬂows of intra-family transfers as well as other unobservable household state variables;
The coeﬃcient γi measures the marginal eﬀects of a corresponding regressor, of which γ1 and
γ2 are parameters of interests capturing the marginal eﬀect of inter-household transfers and that
of public transfers on individual retirement choice, respectively. As argued in the theoretical
part, since transfers have positive eﬀects on the elderly’s demand for labor coeﬃcients γ1 and
γ2 both are expected to have positive signs.
Endogeneity of Inter-household Transfers and a Set of Instrument Variables
Assuming that all regressors are exogenous, the model can be estimated directly by any
standard estimation method. That is, either OLS or probit or logit estimation method yields
consistent estimates. However, the assumption that inter-household transfers are exogenous
is questionable. As argued in the previous section, once parents could act strategically to
draw more transfers from their children, inter-household private transfers should be treated as
an endogenous variable. In this case, the latent demand for leisure (or retirement decision)
and inter-household transfers are jointly determined. Ignoring endogeneity of inter-household
transfers results in inconsistent estimates.
I assume that private transfers to the parent is a function of the parent’s latent demand
for leisure and other characteristics of parents and characteristics of the child household who
transfers to the parents as







i is a vector of characteristics of the independent children controlling their human
capital and wealth; X
p
i is a vector of characteristics of the parent controlling human capital,
income and wealth of the parent; ε2
i is random error term;(ε1
i, ε2
i) are zero-mean normally








When inter-household transfers are an endogenous variable, it is necessary to control for the
problem of endogeneity. Identiﬁcation of the model requires ﬁnding a set of valid instruments
that can be reasonably excluded from equation (11). My instrumental variable strategy relies
on the assumption on the inter-household private transfer rule. I use a set of characteristics
variables of children who live outside of the parent household to create instruments for Ti. The
9implicit assumption is that characteristics of these children only aﬀect the parent choice of
labor/leisure indirectly via transfers. The above transfer equation reﬂect this assumption.
The set of instruments are obtained from substituting the latent demand for leisure into
the equation of inter-household private transfers as







Private transfers are expressed as a linear approximation of all the right hand side variables,
which are all possible instrument variables.
Testing of Endogeneity
Endogeneity of inter-household transfers is testable. I apply the Smith-Blundell for testing
the exogeneity of inter-household private transfers. Under the null hypothesis of the Smith-
Blundell test, the model is appropriately speciﬁed with all regressors as exogenous. Under
the alternative hypothesis, the suspected endogenous variable (inter-household transfers) is
expressed as a linear projection of a set of instruments. The residuals obtained from the null
hypothesis model are included. If private transfers are exogenous, the residuals should have no
explanatory power.
Estimation Method
When inter-household private transfers are endogenous, a two-stage procedure is commonly
used to estimate the eﬀect of transfers on retirement. In the ﬁrst stage, an OLS regression
of equation (13) gives consistent estimates and predicted inter-household transfers ￿ Ti . In the
second stage, the predicted values of inter-household transfers ￿ Ti are used in replacing the actual
values of inter-household transfers Ti. The model of retirement choice with projected inter-
household transfers could be estimated by either OLS or probit. As ε1
i is normally distributed,
a probit analysis is employed.
4 Social Security Programs in Vietnam
Before 1995, the social security system of Vietnam consisted of two main programs, which are
pensions and health care. The Ministry of Finance was responsible for collecting contributions
and making outlays to the social security agency to pay for beneﬁciaries. The Ministry of
Health was responsible for providing free health care for all people. The pension system was
designed for employees in the public sector sectors including state owned enterprises and the
10military force. The contribution rates were around 4.7% of basis wage. The social security
system was in high deﬁcit. Beneﬁt payments relied mainly on subsidies from the government
budget, which accounted for around 80% of annual social security payments.
After 1995, the social security has been reformed to sustain social security funding and to
meet the increasing needs of workers in the private sector. The new laws including the Labor
Code, the Cooperatives Law, the Regulations on Social Insurance and Regulations on Social
Insurance for Armed Forces and Public Security Personnel had been issued between 1994 and
1996 in order to provide a legal framework for the establishment of a new social security system
that is aimed at gradually extending coverage to workers in the private sector. According to
the reform, the social security system in Vietnam is organized into 3 main components. The
ﬁrst component is social insurance which includes public pensions, public insurance programs
for health, unemployment and disability. The second component contains all transfer payment
programs to war veterans and deceased veterans’ families and social diﬃculty relief program.
The last component consists of all social relief programs such as regular social assistance,
emergency assistance and starvation relief.
In 1995 the government established an independent government agency called Vietnam
Social Security with responsibilities for running the social security system. The social secur-
ity fund was established based on the pay-as-you-go principle and was separated from the
government budget operations. Under the new laws, a compulsory contribution-based social
insurance system also covers all private sector workers working in enterprises with 10 or more
employees. Employers contribute 10 % of their payroll and employees contribute 5 % of their
monthly wage for pensions and survivor’s schemes. The replacement rate is around 75% of
average wages over the last 5 years prior to retirement. Even with these new arrangements,
the government subsidizes social security when there is a deﬁcit.
5 Data
5.1 Vietnam Living Standard Surveys
Vietnam is chosen as a case study for an empirical investigation. The country is a typical
example of a low-income country, which has signiﬁcant private transfers and a large fraction of
the elderly participating in the labor force while public pensions play a minor role. Data used
in the analysis come from the Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) which was conducted
by the General Statistic Oﬃce of Vietnam with technical assistance from the World Bank in
111997 − 98. The survey sample consists of 6000 representative households. The data from
the Vietnam Living Standard Survey in 1998 contain suﬃcient information on demographics,
employment, income, assets, health status, and transfers.
The data used for estimations are a sub-sample of the VLSS 1998 data set. A sample of the
elderly are extracted from the data set in the following way. I deﬁne elderly as being older than
55 for women and older than for 60 men but not older than 80. The justiﬁcations for these
lower bounds come from the context of Vietnam. According to the Labor Code, the eligible
ages for pension beneﬁts are 55 and 60 for women and men, respectively. The public pensioners
are allowed to work in the private sector while receiving pension beneﬁts. So, the ages starting
from 55 for women and from 60 for men are critical time to consider a retirement decision. The
justiﬁcation for the upper bound is from the fact that retirement and labor supply choices are
not relevant at very high ages. When agents are over the age of 80, they are not physically
able to work and the marginal cost of leisure is close to zero. As seen in ﬁgure 1, the labor
force participation rate is almost zero after the age of 80. In addition, there are as many as
500 the elderly who do not have any member living outside are excluded from the sample. My
identiﬁcation strategy requires the elderly to have at least one child living separately; otherwise
I can’t ﬁnd instrument variables for inter-household private transfers. Finally, all observations
with some missing value are also excluded. The actual size of the sample used in the estimation
drops to 2565 observations.
5.2 Data Description
Labor Supply
The overall picture of labor market behavior in Vietnam is described in ﬁgure 1. Age groups
from 30 to 40 are most active in the labor force. People participate in the labor force until very
high ages.
Labor market behavior of the elderly in Vietnam is described in the ﬁrst panel of ﬁgure 1
and in table 1. Overall, only 49.6% of the Vietnamese elderly choose to retire and the others
are still active in the labor force. Retirement is heterogeneous by gender. Women retire earlier
than men.
The retirement rate increases with age. The retirement rate rises from 36% at age of 60−64
to 72% at age of 75 −80. Strikingly, more than 37% of elderly even at age 70 or older can not
aﬀord to retire and remain in the labor force.1
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Labor Market Behavior
Figure 1: Labor Force Participation
13Table 1: Retitrement by Age and Gender
MALE FEMALE BOTH N
AGE No Yes Yes(%) No Yes Yes(%) No Yes Yes(%)
55-59 0 0 282 147 34.27 282 147 34.2 429
60-64 225 102 33.22 228 157 40.78 453 259 36.4 712
65-69 169 147 46.52 159 193 54.83 328 340 50.9 668
70-74 92 96 51.06 72 185 71.98 164 281 63.1 445
75-80 42 81 65.85 30 158 84.04 72 239 72.2 311
N 528 426 44.65 771 849 52.14 1299 1266 49.4 2565
Transfers
Inter-household transfers are overwhelmingly dominant over public transfers in Vietnam.
The coverage of social security system is relatively low compared to that of the family support
system. Only 11.6% of the elderly received public social security. Meanwhile, about 26% of
the elderly received ﬁnancial support from children and relatives. However, the amount of
government transfers is also smaller than that of private transfers. On average public transfers
are 1.4 times larger than the average private transfers.
Table 2: Transfers to the Elderly by Sources
PRIVATE PUBLIC
AGE Transactions % Amount Transactions % Amount
55 − 59 101 23.54 173.7 64 12.92 203.9
60 − 64 151 21.21 189.9 105 14.75 297.3
65 − 69 181 27.10 204.6 67 10.03 305.9
70 − 74 140 31.46 270.9 42 9.44 309.6
75 − 80 101 32.48 283.9 20 6.43 329.7
Average 674 26.28 224.6 298 11.62 306.0
Unit: US dollar in 1998
Interestingly, the fraction of the elderly receiving private transfers increases while the frac-
tion of the elderly receiving public transfers decreases over age. This is a signal that private
transfers are used to substitute the missing public transfers.
5.3 Speciﬁcation of Variables
In the following, I will describe how main variables are calculated.2 The data has information
on private inter-household transfers to each member of a household. Private transfers to the
elderly (Inter-household transfers) are calculated by adding up all inter-household transfers
http://www.who.int/countries/vnm/en/)
2All variables measured in terms of local currency values are converted to the corresponding US-dollar value
in 1998.
14from all sources to each elderly members of the household. Unfortunately, public transfers to
individual members of a household are not available but only to the household as a whole. I
assume that old individuals in a household have an equal share of the total amount of public
transfers to the household regardless their genders. That is, public transfers to an individual
elderly (Pension) are measured in terms of public pensions per a old individual in a household.
The data on retirement choice (Retirement) are constructed in the following way. The data
have information about employment status in the last 12 months. Particularly, the survey
asked questions whether an individual work or not, if not, why not and if yes, how many hours.
I use this information to partition the elderly into two groups, one that contains all the elderly
who do not participate in the labor force and one that contains the elderly who do. Some of
the elderly do not participate in the labor force because they failed to ﬁnd a job even though
they want to work. These elderly are forced to retire. The data contain questions on reasons
why an elderly person does not work. I use this information to identify who is forced to retire.
There are only 9 individual elderly in the sample failing to ﬁnd a job and being forced to retire.
Since it is relatively small, it is ﬁne to remove all of these elderly from the sample.
The vector of the elderly’s characteristics (Xp) includes variables reﬂecting the main char-
acteristics of the elderly such as the household position, sex, age, marital status, educational




consists of household size, average age, average education achievement,
number of household members older than 80 years old, number of household members younger








includes number of non-coresiding members, average age, aver-
age educational achievement, numbers of non-coresiding members living aboard and numbers
of non-coresiding members living in big cities. A full list and deﬁnition of variables used for my
econometric models are presented in table 3. Summary statistics of these variables are reported
in table 4.
6 Empirical Results
Endogeneity of inter-household transfers
The Smith-Blundell test statistic for exogeneity is 4.684869 with a P-value of 0.0304. The
Smith-Blundell’s test of exogeneity rejects the exogeneity of inter-household transfer variable.
15Table 3: Deﬁnition of Variables
Variables Deﬁnition
Retirement Dummy variable, = 1 if retired
Inter-household transfers Private transfers received by the elderly
Pension
Public transfers including pension and
other government subsidies
Characteristics of the Elderly (Xp)
Head Dummy variable for household head
Sex Dummy gender
Age Age of the elderly
Age2 Age squared
Marital status
Dummy variable for marital status
= 1 if married and = 0 otherwise
Co-residing spouse
Dummy variable
= 1 if spouse is alive and a co-resident
,
Educational achievement
Dummy variable: primary = 1,
secondary = 2 , tertiary = 3, and = 0 otherwise
Poor health Dummy variable, = 1 if health condition is poor
Transfers out
Dummy variable, =1 if the elderly transfers to
household members living outside
Characteristics of Co-residing Members
￿
Xdc￿
Average Education of others
Average educational achievements
of co-residing members
Household size Number of household members
Number of young
Number of household members
younger than 10 years old
Number of old
Number of household members
older than 80 years old
Number of unemployment Number of household members unemployed
Overall Characteristics of Household
￿
Xh￿
Sharing house Dummy, =1 if sharing a house with others
Durable Money value of key durable goods
Urban Dummy =1 if living area is urban
Characteristics of Independent Children
￿
Xic￿
Average age of ncm
Average age of family members
living out of the elderly’s household
Average education of ncm
Average education achievement
of the non-coresiding member
Number of non-coresiding members (ncm) Total number of family members living outside
Number of ncm living abroad Number of family members living in abroad
Number of ncm living in cities Number of family members living in city
16Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Retirement 0.494 (0.5) 0 1 2565
Inter-household transfer 59.01 (283.166) 0 5499.962 2565
Pension 35.558 (119.663) 0 991.826 2565
Head 0.481 (0.5) 0 1 2565
Sex 0.628 (0.483) 0 1 2565
Age 65.939 (6.449) 55 80 2565
Age squared 4389.495 (861.847) 3025 6400 2565
Marital status 0.706 (0.456) 0 1 2565
Co-residing spouse 0.686 (0.464) 0 1 2565
Educational achievement 0.898 (0.77) 0 3 2565
Poor health 0.071 (0.256) 0 1 2565
Transfers out 0.074 (0.263) 0 1 2565
Household size 4.669 (2.126) 2 19 2565
Number of old (> 80) 0.059 (0.251) 0 2 2565
Number of young(< 10) 0.538 (0.908) 0 5 2565
Number of unemployment 0.273 (0.609) 0 5 2565
Average education of others 0.994 (0.867) 0 3 2565
Sharing house with other households 0.913 (0.282) 0 1 2565
Value of durables 697.298 (1211.706) 1.528 18442.441 2565
Regions 5.544 (2.975) 1 10 2565
Income quintiles 3.387 (1.341) 1 5 2565
Number of non-coresiding members(ncm) 4.148 (2.131) 1 12 2565
Average age of ncm 34.505 (6.108) 4 61.5 2565
Average education achievement of ncm 1.72 (1.05) 0 3 2565
Number of ncm living abroad 0.094 (0.433) 0 5 2565
Number of ncm living in cities 0.861 (1.53) 0 12 2565
17This result indicates that inter-household transfers are not exogenously determined. Hence,
there are some interactions between retirement choice and inter-household transfers. Therefore,
it is necessary to control for endogeneity of inter-household transfers when estimating the eﬀects
of public and inter-household transfers on retirement choice.
Retirement Choice
Table 5: Probit Estimates of Retirement: Marginal Eﬀects
Probit IVProbit
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Inter-household transfer .00014 .01466 .00132 .00625
Pension .00029 .00373 .00067 .01004
Head (d) —.14092 .00000 —.37804 .00000
Sex (d) .00500 .87311 .00008 .99921
Age —.00320 .92971 —.01115 .90444
Age squared .00023 .40148 .00059 .39393
Marital status (d) —.04204 .62575 —.21352 .34958
Co-residing spouse (d) —.22404 .00500 —.47497 .03349
Educational achievement .00409 .79648 .01512 .70999
Poor health (d) .09139 .03253 .11777 .34663
Transfers out (d) —.13791 .00144 —.40087 .00074
Household size .04019 .00000 .10121 .00000
Number of old (>80) —.07070 .14313 —.18793 .12899
Number of young(<10) —.01479 .37617 —.03844 .36775
Average education of others .01280 .41729 .04137 .30918
Sharing house with other households (d) —.07115 .07791 —.19504 .06638
Value of durables .00007 .00000 .00012 .00288
Urban area (d) .35566 .00000 .90066 .00000
-
No. of observations 2565 2565
Source: Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1998
I estimate the model of retirement choice with two methods. First, I estimate the retirement
choice model with standard probit estimation method, treating inter-household transfers as an
exogenous variable. Then, I estimate the retirement choice model with IV probit estimation
method, treating inter-household transfer as an endogenous variable. The estimation results are
reported in table 5. The estimates of marginal eﬀects and p-values of the former are reported
in columns 2 and 3, respectively. The estimates of marginal eﬀects and p-values of the later
are reported in column 4 and 5, respectively.
The estimates of inter-household transfers and public transfers are positive and highly
signiﬁcant under both approaches. The positive signs of coeﬃcients of pension and inter-
household transfer variables are consistent with the crowding-out hypothesis. Precisely, it
18indicates that the more transfers received by the elderly from either public or private sources
the more likely the elderly will withdraw from the labor force.
Interestingly, the magnitudes of the estimates are substantially diﬀerent. The estimate of
inter-household transfers using the IV probit method is almost 10 times larger than that using
standard probit method. Similarly, the estimate of the pension eﬀect is at least twice as large
as that used standard probit estimation method. This result is consistent with the hypothesis
that the dynamics of private transfers and labor supply of the elderly play a role in magnifying
the crowding-out eﬀect of public transfers on labor supply. My result implies that when not
controlling for endogeneity of inter-household transfers, which is caused by these interactions
between inter-household transfers received and labor supplied by the elderly, the eﬀects of both
public and private transfers are signiﬁcantly under-estimated.
The coeﬃcients of public and private transfers are not the same as seen in theoretical
models. This indicates that the motives for private transfers are not purely altruistic. Perhaps
surprisingly, inter-household transfers have more inﬂuence on retirement decisions than public
pensions do. The coeﬃcients of inter-household transfers is at least twice as big as that of
public transfers. The estimates imply that an additional 100 US dollar increase (roughly
a quarter of GDP per capita in the same year) in private transfers per year increases the
retirement probability by 13% while the exact same increase in public pension only increases
the probability by 7%.
Some of demographic characteristics of the elderly play a role in determining the retirement
choice. The elderly who are the head of a household tend to have a longer work life. The
elderly whose spouse is alive and coresident are more likely to work. Health status is one of
determinants of retirement choice. The elderly with bad health conditions tend to drop out
of the labor force earlier. Human capital seems not to be a key determinant of retirement
choice in old ages as the estimate of the variable of educational achievement is positive but not
signiﬁcant.
The estimation results indicate that other characteristics of household including the house-
hold size, household human capital, housing condition, value of durables, and living areas are
also inﬂuencing factors of the elderly’s retirement choice. The elderly in the household of bigger
size, fewer dependents and higher human capital are more likely to retire. Housing condition
and the value of durables as proxies for asset holdings are important predictors of the retire-
ment choice. The elderly who have to share a house with other households tend to retire late.
The values of durables is also positively and signiﬁcantly correlated to the probability to retire.
19The elderly living in urban areas, which are higher income areas, are more likely to withdraw
from the labor force earlier than the elderly living in rural areas. Hence, the individuals liv-
ing in a household with a better proﬁle are more likely to aﬀord retirement when old. This
result implies that in addition to intra-family transfers, which are unobservable but could be
inferred from characteristics of other household members, play important role in determining
the elderly’s retirement choice.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the role of the interactions between private transfers received and
labor supplied by the elderly in analyzing the eﬀects of public transfers in the context of devel-
oping countries. First, I show the these interactions alter the opportunity cost of retirement,
which then magnify the crowding-out eﬀects of public transfers. This result has an implication
for evaluating the eﬀects of public transfers in developing countries. It is necessary to control
for the endogeneity of private transfers, which results from the interactions between private
transfers and labor choice of the elderly. Otherwise, it under-estimates the crowding-out ef-
fects. Then, using the data from Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1998, I ﬁnd that the eﬀects
of public transfers is substantially under-estimated when not controlling for the endogeneity
of inter-household transfers. In addition, I ﬁnd the evidence supporting the hypothesis that
public transfers crowding-out labor supply of the elderly.
The paper has focused on the retirement choice of the elderly. An extension is to estimate
the crowding-out eﬀects of public transfers on hours worked.
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